



# Delegation BoF

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# Setting the scene: SRM

- SRM
  - Protocol for controlling storage
- Delegation
  - Allows an SRM server to act “on behalf of” end-user.
  - Creating X.509 certificate & private key on server, signed by end-user.
- GSI
  - V. similar to SSLv3 but incompatible.
  - Allows clients to trigger delegation

# Why delegate?

- Protocol-independent 3<sup>rd</sup>-party copy  
srmCopy
- Reserving network bandwidth  
srmPrepareTo(Get|Put), srm(Get|Put)Done,  
srmCopy
- X.509-aware tertiary storage  
SrmBringOnline, srmPrepareTo(Get|Put),  
srm(Get|Put)Done, srmCopy
- Federated SRM  
Everything except srmPing.

## Why switch from GSI to SSL?

- GSI is **not a standard** (SSLv3 is)
- Coupling delegation with transport negotiation is **inflexible**.
- It's **not widely used** outside of Grid
- Only libraries are coming from a **single vendor**: Globus
- Hard to add advanced features; e.g., **no hardware acceleration**.

# What to do about delegation?

- If delegation isn't needed then SSLv3 should work fine.
- When delegation is needed then client requires some extra functionality.
- Soln: a service that allows delegation.  
(NB. we're **not** talking about a single, per-site shared service; rather, each service has a common extra API)

# Delegation Services

Name	Tech.	C / Native		Java / JVM		Supported
		Client	Server	Client	Server	
Globus Credential Delegation Service	<b>SOAP</b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>N</b>
GridSite Delegation Service	<b>SOAP</b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>Y</b>
Globus New Delegation Service	<b>REST</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Y</b>
IVOA Delegation Service	<b>REST</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>N</b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>Y</b>	<b>M</b>



# Introducing the winner

- GDS is a **de facto standard**.
  - Developed ~2005 by Andrew McNab for web management software.
  - Adopted by gLite, after going through a review process
- Current version is v2.0.0
  - In production (FTS, GridSite, ...)
- **Two** independently developed libraries (Java and C), both provide **client** and **server**.

## **GDS: an EMI standard**

- Other services in EMI also need to delegate
  - EMI ES (execution service), FTS, ...
- Agreement to use GDS within EMI.
- Current API docs need tidying up:
  - Conflates documenting software with documenting the standard,
  - Leaves some things too vague.
- Some work underway in this area



## Taking it further

- GDS is a “standard” only within EMI.
  - Not endorsed by any standards body.
- No obviously applicable standard
- Should we start an OGF WG ?
  - Suggest writing up GDS as an experience report

## Talked to David Chadwick

- Sadly, he couldn't make it today.
- I've tried to summarize his comments in the following two slides
  - He makes good points
  - To me, the questions/points seem very reasonable, but I don't completely agree with his “answers” :-)

# Comments from D. Chadwick 1

- Delegation should be:
  - accountable, revokable, fine-grained, recursive/re-entrant
- He described an existing system:
  - Uses federated identity
  - Delegation uses a trusted 3<sup>rd</sup> party: an Attribute Authority (AA).
  - Result is an authz attribute:
    - Either a SAML attribute assertion
    - or X509 AC, signed by AA

## Comments from D. Chadwick 2

- GDS isn't “delegation”, but “masquerading”
  - The 3<sup>rd</sup> party doesn't know the identity of the delegatee.
- Masquerading may be implemented as special case of “real” Delegation.

## Comments from D. Chadwick 3

- Doesn't wire-protocol already exist?
  - CMP (RFC 4210) or CMC (RFC 5273)
  - Somewhat “inverted” roles:
    - The delegator is CA, delegatee is EE,
  - Would need a “kick-off” message
    - Equivalent to a message from CA → EE, saying “you want to request a cert. now”
    - Believes such a message may exist, but it might not.

# My thoughts ..

- Properties of delegation:
  - Accountability: not with GDS
  - Revokable: not with GDS (do we need it for short-lived credentials?)
  - Fine-grain: not with GDS
  - Recursive/re-entrant: yes.
- Believe CMP lacks features from GDS:
  - ability to associate certificate with an ID.
    - Might not be a problem: use Alt. Name ext.
  - session management.

## My thoughts ..

- Fine-grain authz requires defn of operation semantics
  - User A delegates either
    - ability to do operation X to B: what does 'X' mean?
    - Or a role / attribute (equiv. What does the role mean? Already agreement with VOMS)
- GDS doesn't require trusted 3<sup>rd</sup> party.



# My thoughts ..

- Attribute certificates?
  - A signs B's cert with an attribute stating B can do operation X (or role) on her behalf.
- Believe it's hard to allow revocation without trusted 3<sup>rd</sup> party.

## Possible way forward

- Form (research/working/..) group within OGF to look into delegation.
- Document the current status:
  - Provide a formal description of GDS as an experience document
  - David Chadwick says he can write an equivalent document for his system.
- Look to see if there's interest in establishing a common standard here.



# Thank you!

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