From: "Laurence Field" To: "Laurence Field" Subject: CD Group Report for C5-09-Jan-2009 Date: 08 January 2009 19:12 LCG deployment ============== - Total number of Sites (1): 265 - Status -> Num. Sites (1): ok -> 205 degraded -> 16 down -> 44 - Software -> Num. Sites (2): gLite-3_1_0 -> 230 gLite-3_0_2 -> 11 gLite-3_0_0 -> 1 - Average of concurrently running jobs during this week (3): 40.0k (1) Sites that are Certified, in Production and that have been monitored by SAM during the last week under OPS credentials. SAM is available at: https://lcg-sam.cern.ch:8443/sam/sam.py To see this page one needs a grid certificate loaded in the browser. The calculation of the Site availability (Status) is described at: https://cern.ch/twiki/pub/LCG/GridView/Gridview_Service_Availability_Computation.pdf Pre-Production Service ================ Nothing special to report for PPS Integration, Test & Release Report ======================= * Patches Certified patch #2701: Adding which dependency to glite-WN patch #2702: Adding which dependency to glite-WN x86_64 patch #2707: [ yaim-torque ] YAIM release for torque server, client and utils A problem with proxy renewal was found in VOMS patch #2613. * Releases Patches scheduled for release to PPS: #2563 R3.1/i386/SLC4: DPM/LFC v1.7.0 #2564 R3.1/x86_64/SLC4: DPM/LFC v1.7.0 #2652 Fixes for FQAN order, short FQANs + miscellaneous [4] x86_64 #2680 VDT 1.6.1 Release 9 SL4/x86 #2682 VDT 1.6.1 Release 9 SL4/x86_64 #2701 Adding which dependency to glite-WN #2702 Adding which dependency to glite-WN x86_64 #2706 Removing Multivalue SE from GlueCESEBind x86_64 #2707 [ yaim-torque ] YAIM release for torque server, client and utils SAM ==== Stable service over the Christmas period Operational Security ============== The CERN ROC was contacted over Christmas by the French ROC, which suspected a security issue with some connections from the CERN CVS service to their sites. A quick investigation revealed there was no security issue and the service behaviour was as expected. Security vulnerability affecting OpenSSL and CAs using MD5 have been announced, however the IGTF released appropriate security bulletins confirming the risk for the grid infrastructure was not significant.